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optional right comes into existence when the insured has failed
to exercise his choice. The question then is when has the insured
failed to exercise his option. The Louisiana non-forfeiture statute
does not specify the term within which the insured must make
his election. However, when the issue becomes pertinent, the
Louisiana courts will probably follow the general rule that when
no time limit for the exercise of an option is fixed by the contract
or statute, the right to exercise it expires after the passage of a
reasonable time" and what constitutes a reasonable time must be
determined by the circumstances of each case."4 Once it has been
determined that the conditional option has come into existence
the language of the statute "without any further act on the part
of the owner of the policy" infers that the insurer may exercise
his option without any hesitation or notification to the insured.
In order to be more certain that they will be allowed to exercise their option in the event the insured fails to exercise his,
the insurance companies should be careful to omit any clauses in
policies issued in Louisiana which the court might interpret as a
waiver of the insured's right to an option at the time the policy
lapses. Since it is a settled rule of contract law that parties may
agree upon what constitutes a reasonable time, it might be wise
for insurance companies to insert a term provision in their policies to the effect that sixty days after the lapse of the policy the
insurer will exercise his right to apply the reserve fund in one of
two ways. However, particularly in a hard fact case, the court
might decide that the sixty day clause is a restriction or delimitation on the insured's right. A lengthy stride might be taken by
the Louisiana legislature toward settling the uncertainties which
exist in the Louisiana non-forfeiture statute and relieving our
courts of numerous, costly controversies by following the examples of the majority of jurisdictions and inserting a time limit
clause stipulating when the insured's option terminates.
J. C. T., Jr.
NEGLIGENCE-SCOPE OF TORTFEASORS LIABILITY--ON PREGNANCY

AND OTHER PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS-Plaintiff had stopped her

car at an intersection in obedience to a traffic signal. While in this
stationary position the automobile was run into from the rear by
a truck owned by the defendant company and driven by one of
13. 3 Couch, Encyclopedia of Insurance Law (1929) 2078-2079, § 641a.
Marti v. Midwest Life Ins. Co., 108 Neb. 845, 189 N.W. 388, 29 A.L.R. 1507

(1922).
14. 4 Cooley, Briefs on the Law of Insurance (2 ed. 1927) 3815, c. 14.
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its employees. Plaintiff was pregnant at the time of the collision
and the impact caused her body to be thrown forward against
the steering wheel of her car. Plaintiff brought action for damages for personal injuries and for loss of her child resulting from
its premature birth. Held, the negligence of defendant's employee
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries and she is entitled to compensation. The fact that plaintiff was pregnant at the
time of the accident is a factor to be considered in fixing the
amount of damages. Broughton v. T.S.C. Motor FreightLines, Incorporated, 200 La. 421, 8 So. (2d) 76 (1942).
It is a fundamental principle of tort law that the wrongdoer is
liable for any injury which is the natural and probable consequence of his misconduct; and the question always is, was there
an unbroken connection between the wrongful act and the injury? Did the facts constitute a continuous succession of events
so linked together as to make a natural whole, or was there some
new and independent cause intervening between the wrongful
act and the injury? It is not necessary in order to render a negligent act or omission the proximate cause of an injury that actor
could or should have foreseen the particular consequence or precise form of injury. It is enough if, by the exercise of reasonable
care, he might have foreseen or anticipated that some injury
might result from his negligent act.
A tortfeasor must take his victims as he finds them. This rule
is aptly stated by Judge Westerfield in Poncet v. South New Orleans Light and Traction Company: "the duty of care and of abstaining from injuring another is due to the weak, the sick, and
the infirm, equally with the healthy and strong, and when that
duty is violated the measure of damages is based on the injury
inflicted, even though that injury might have been aggravated, or
might not have happened at all but for the peculiar physical condition of the person injured."' This rule is grounded on the very
practical consideration that the tortious injury sets the existing
condition in motion, and that the latter cannot be regarded as the
independent cause of the damage, nor can the wrongdoer be allowed to apportion the measure of responsibility to the initial
cause.'
1. Poncet v. South New Orleans Light and Traction Co., 3 La. App. 64, 66
(1925).
2. Castelluchio v. Cloverland Dairy Products Co., 7 La. App. 534 (1928).
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While it is true that the negligent defendant in the principal
case had no specific reason to expect his victim to be a pregnant
woman, he did know that women drivers and passengers are
often in such a condition. Where a trespass is committed on the
person of another the fact that she turns out to be one of the large
class of pregnant women cannot mitigate the damages recoverable by her if she sustains injury, and the negligent party is
liable for such damages as will fairly compensate the one injured
for mental, physical pain and suffering and any impairment of
her health occasioned by a resultant miscarriage.8 Where the negligent person's act was the proximate cause of the miscarriage,
recovery has been allowed in all Louisiana decisions,' and recovery has been allowed where the plaintiff suffered nervous shock
at the time of pregnancy but no miscarriage.5
There are, however, some well recognized limitations upon
the negligent defendant's liability. He is not liable for mental
suffering of the plaintiff after the birth of the child or for prospective mental suffering and disappointment caused by its deformed condition, except where the injury is wilful, wanton, or
malicious.6 Also, he is not liable for injury to the plaintiff's feelings or mere sentimental suffering following a miscarriage and
not constituting a part of the pain naturally attending it; or for
injury to the child and the parent's loss of its society and prospective earnings. 7 The expectant mother cannot recover damages
for the child born dead because it has no legal personality distinct
from its mother."
'While almost all jurisdictions are in accord as to the fact that
a pre-existing condition or injury does not constitute an intervening cause and will not bar recovery for negligent injury, they
are at variance upon the measure of damages in such cases. In
Louisiana the right to recover damages is based upon the broad
language of Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870:
"Every act whatever of a man that causes damage to another
3. Nevala v. Ironwood, 232 Mich. 316, 205 N.W. 93 (1925).
4. Stewart v. Arkansas Southern Ry., 112 La. 764, 36 So. 676 (1904); Joiner
v. Texas and Pacific Ry., 128 La. 1050, 55 So. 670 (1911); Thomson v. Cooke,
147 La. 922, 86 So. 332 (1920); Youman v. McConnell and McConnell, Inc., 7
La. App. 315 (1927); Green v. Frederick, 141 So. 505 (La. App. 1932); White v.
Juge, 176 La. 1045, 142 So. 851, 147 So. 72 (1933).
5. Holzab v. New Orleans and Carrollton Ry., 38 La. Ann. 185 (1886);
Favarola v. New Orleans Ry. and Light Co., 143 La. 572, 78 So. 944 (1918).
6. Nevala v. Ironwood, 232 Mich. 316, 205 N.W. 93 (1925).
7. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Cooper, 71 Tex. 507, 9 S.W. 598 (1888).
8. Youman v. McConnell and McConnell, Inc., 7 La. App. 315 (1927).
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obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.. .," and the

question of the measure of damages is better settled than in other
jurisdictions. A clear majority of Louisiana decisions follow the
liberal view that where the negligent defendant activates an
existing injury or a dormant condition the injured person is entitled to recover for the recurrence or aggravation of his affliction
as a result of the accident.9 Thus where plaintiffs, who had eaten
poisoned food purchased from the defendant, were afflicted with
dormant chronic appendicitis and heart trouble, the court held
that the defendant whose negligence caused the dormant condition to become active was responsible for as much of the aggravated affliction as resulted from his negligence. 10
A subsequently contracted disease presents another problem.
The fact that an injury to the person creates a decreased power
of resistance to a disease will not per se render the injury the
proximate cause of a subsequently contracted disease. The supervening disease must be deemed foreseeable .The courts have upheld findings that a personal injury was the proximate cause of
supervening cancer," peritonitis, appendicitis, blood poisoning
and varicose veins,1 2 impotency, 18 loss of child-bearing power, 14
pneumonia," heart disease, paralysis, consumption, rheumatism,
and spinal afflictions. 8 In one case, the court held that although
the immediate cause of a woman's insanity was climacteria, the
shock that she received in an accident resulting from the defend9. Lapleine v. M6rgans La. and Tex. Ry. and S.S. Co., 40 La. Ann. 661,

4 So. 875, 1 L.R.A. 878 (1888) (latent hysterical hythesis symptoms never exhibited before accident); Hall v. Excelsior Steam Laundry Co., 5 La. App. 6
(1925) (plaintiff was suffering climacteria and the accident caused by defendant's negligence produced insanity); Castelluchio v. Cloverland Dairy
Products Co., 7 La. App. 534 (1928) (cerebral hemorrhage resulted from aggravation of arterio sclerosis and high blood pressure); Goins v. Moore, 143
So. 522 (La. App. 1932) (Plaintiff had previous knee injury; subsequent injury
caused by defendant's negligence produced complete ankylosis); Peppers v.
Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co., 198 So. 177 (La. App. 1940) (latent "colitis" activated); Levy v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 8 So.(2d) 774 (La. App. 1942) (plaintiff

suffered recurrence of mental disorder).
10. Arndt v. D. H. Holmes Co., Ltd., 9 La. App. 36, 119 So. 91 (1928).
11. Baltimore City R.R. v. Kemp, 61 Md. 619, 48 Am. Rep. 134 (1883).
12. Murphy v. Southern Pacific Ry., 31 Nev. 120, 101 Pac. 322, 21 Am. Cas.

502 (1909).
13. Denver and Rio Grande Ry. v. Harris, 122 U.S. 597, 7 S.Ct. 1286, 30

L.Ed. 1146 (1887).
901 (1905).
14. Normile v. Wheeling Traction Co., 57 W.Va. 132, 49 S.E. 1030, 68 L.R.A.
15. City of Nashville v. Reese, 138 Tenn. 471, 197 S.W. 492, L.R.A. 1918B
349 (1917).
16. Dougherty -v.New Orleans Ry. and Light Co., 127 La. 225, 53 So. 532
(1910); Hanlon v. Missouri and Pacific Ry., 104 Mo. 381, 16 S.W. 233 (1891);

Schafer v. Gilmer, 13 Nev. 330 (1878).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. V

ant's negligence was the proximate cause and that the defendant
was liable -for all the consequences of his negligent act. 7
J.C.M.

RAILROADS-DUTY TO UNKNOWN TREsPASsERs-Plaintiff's one
year old child was struck and killed by defendant's train which
was travelling at fifty miles per hour on a clear morning in
sparsely settled farm country. The child had wandered from its
parent's care, up a footpath that crossed the defendant's railway,
tracks. Plaintiff sues to recover damages for the death of the
child, -alleging negligence of the defendant by improper speed
and other lack of care. Held, the railroad was not liable, as it was
under no duty to look out for trespassers in open country and
might travel at any rate of speed consistent with the safety of its
passengers. Sullivan v. Yazoo & M. V. Railway Company, 8
So. (2d) 109 (La. App. 1942).
In general, the landowner owes no duty to foresee the presence of, or to prevent injury to unknown trespassers; and this
same rule has been applied to the railroad in the operation of
trains on its right of way.1 The railroad has not been charged with
knowledge of the trespasser's presence in cases where the person
killed was in a forest area 1300 feet from a crossing, and where
there were only a few scattered houses and a turpentine distillery in the vicinity;2 where the person killed was in railroad's
yards; 3 or where the person killed was riding on a logging train.'
In each case the court reiterates that the railroad owes no duty to
a trespasser except not to injure him wilfully and wantonly after
his presence is known. 5 However, where there is habitual trespassing over a limited area by a large number of people, the railroad is under a duty to "look out." This is in accord with the
analogous duty owed by a landowner to habitual and frequent
17. Hall v. Excelsior Steam Laundry Co., Ltd., 5 La. App. 6 (1925).
1. Johnson v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 16 La. App. 464, 133 So. 517, 135 So. 114
(1931); Trotter v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 146 So. 365 (La. App. 1933). 3 Elliott, A.
Treatise on the Law of Railroads (1897) 1970, § 1253.
2. Savage and Wife v. Tremont Lumber Co., 3 La. App. 704 (1926).
3. Sizemore v. Yazoo & M.V. Ry., 164 So. 648 (La. App. 1935).
4. Morris v. Great Southern Lumber Co., 132 La. 306, 61 So. 383 (1913).
5. Texas & P. Ry. v. Modawell, 151 Fed. 421, 80 C.C.A. 651, 9 L.R.A.(N.S.)
646 (1907); Whitcomb v. Louisville & N. Ry., 47 La. Ann. 225, 16 So. 812
(1895); Spizale v. Louisiana Ry. and Navigation Co., 128 La. 187, 54 So. 714
(1911).
6. Lea v. Kentwood & E. Ry., 131 La. 852, 60 So. 370 (1913); Jones v.

Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 162 La. 690, 111 So. 62 (1926) (twenty-five to seventy
persons crossed footpath daily); Builliard v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 166

